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The New Frontier: Genetic Analysis and the Concept of Rights 
Infringement 
TYLER COUNSIL 
Oakland City University 
ABSTRACT 
Major highlights of genetic analysis and its implications in the field of 
forensic science are discussed at length, including the discovery of 
polymerase chain reaction and the importance of one’s genetic material as 
criminal evidence. A discussion of recent trends in molecular techniques 
will give way to a necessary dialogue regarding the potential pitfalls 
pertaining to overinvestment in genetic profiling. Major topics of debate 
include the use of arrestee databases, constitutional rights infringements 
through molecular analysis, and unwarranted evidence collection. 
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Evidence Collection 
The popular allure of technological advancement can perhaps be best summarized 
by a thought from science-fiction novelist Arthur C. Clarke, who noted, “Any sufficiently 
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic” (McCracken 2009:1). Clarke’s 
statement certainly seems to hold weight; any new technology made available to society 
always seems to captivate our minds and hold our hearts still for a fleeting moment. On 
television, one may switch to almost any given channel and find topical shows focused 
on new and amazing medical, industrial, or even fictional technology. Even the most 
novel advances in technology will eventually lose their shine as individuals get away 
from the enchanted feeling through commonplace, everyday use of these advanced pieces 
of equipment or methods. It is in this moment of reality that we finally see the potential 
complexities and problems regarding the use of such forward-thinking ideas.  
The discipline of forensic science may be one of the best examples of the above 
notions. Over the past few years, this area of inquiry has been the darling of both 
television and new college program initiatives. More recently, however, as Bartos (2012) 
and Tam (2012) have argued, the field of forensic science has begun finding itself 
gleaning some scrutiny from critics who believe that such overwhelmingly powerful 
scientific methods and the persons wielding these tools cause more harm than benefit to 
society in many instances.   
Bartos, for example, cited the fact that many laboratories require minimal 
standards for evidence processing and analysis; in fact, Bartos, a journalist by trade, was 
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able to obtain a certification in forensic consultation from the American College of 
Forensic Examiners International, Inc. (ACFEII) within mere hours. This seeming lack of 
stringent requirements necessary for one to become a forensic specialist has led to 
concerns regarding the employment standards and educational competency required for 
hire to a given forensic laboratory in the United States and beyond. Bartos used the fact 
that Seymour Schlager, convicted of attempted murder, was able to obtain ACFEII 
certification as a highlight to the issue associated with the popularity of forensic science 
in today’s society and the lack of standards in forensic education and employment. With 
forensic scientists the world over acting as “expert witnesses” who may sway the minds 
and hearts of a jury in favor or against a defendant, such an example regarding 
employment requirements for being a forensic consultant is both disheartening and 
alarming.   
Aside from hiring issues, the overuse of DNA technology in a criminal case is 
also becoming a major issue in the debate. As Tam observed, issues arise when DNA 
profiles are collected from any possible suspects at a crime scene and the DNA itself is 
used to bring a person in for questioning with no other corroborative evidence indicating 
that the person being interrogated has committed the crime. As an illustration of this 
problem, consider a crime that may occur at one’s place of employment. The DNA of an 
employee present at the institution where the crime has occurred will likely be present 
throughout the workplace, especially if the offense has been committed in a high-traffic 
area in the building where the employee frequents because of the employee’s unique 
work routine. As a result, this employee may be asked for a swab of their DNA to 
“exclude” them from the crime scene.When the profile syncs with the DNA collected at 
the scene, however, this person becomes a suspect simply because their genetic profile 
was present at the area in which a crime occurred. As a result of over-reliance on DNA 
evidence in the case, the employee with no ties to the crime is brought into the precinct 
and must explain why their genetic material was present at the scene, with no other 
supporting evidence indicating guilt or suspicion of the deviant act under investigation.   
Tam’s concerns bring up a significant question for forensic science today: Is DNA 
technology in a forensically relevant setting infringing upon the constitutional and private 
rights of those protected by the law?     
MOLECULAR EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND TECHNOLOGY: TOOLS FOR 
JUSTICE, OR RESTRAINTS TO LIBERTY? 
The issue lying before the citizens of the United States today is whether 
technology has esoterically indoctrinated each individual to such an extent that humanity 
has willingly accepted new equipment, techniques, and methods to combat crime or to 
ease one’s measure of living while simultaneously excising the personal freedoms that 
this country has fought so hard to maintain, much like a daft surgeon removing a piece of 
perfectly healthy tissue. With ambiguous terms such as “War on Terror,” “War on 
Drugs,” and “War on Crime” still lingering in the air and on the lips of bureaucrats 
throughout the nation, the criminal justice system has long sought to gain greater control 
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over the monitoring and preventive processes that help diminish crime so as to achieve an 
effective victory in these intangible and evolving battles against thematic deviance. For 
example, the controversial Project PRISM surveillance project, which monitors all 
private data from nine major companies, was established in 2007 (Atherton 2013). The 
program allows for the federal government to by and large bypass many formerly held 
privacy restrictions provided by these large Internet companies to access an individual’s 
sensitive information in the event that a person may be perceived as a threat to national 
security (Lee 2013). Although Project PRISM is arguably the most scrutinized 
surveillance venture the federal government has been required to defend to date, the issue 
of privacy rights and the use of surveillance technology is a widespread concern at both 
the federal and state levels.   
The U.S. government has been active recently in upscaling its surveillance 
capabilities beyond the scope of Project PRISM, which could have serious implications 
on the privacy rights of citizens both in the United States and beyond. For instance, the 
National Security Agency (NSA) has been placing spyware and malware programs in 
computers purchased by suspect individuals whom the government wishes to monitor 
more closely (Sottek 2013). These types of software programs are typically used by 
criminals to steal sensitive information, such as credit card details or passwords, from 
citizens’ online devices. As such, the U.S. government has been implicated in the 
interception of suspicious persons’ computer purchases so they may upload these 
malicious programs to better facilitate their surveillance needs. Unfortunately, the 
concerns for privacy and technology with our personal electronic devices do not end here 
when it comes to the government’s thirst for information on the civilians under its 
authority. So-called monitoring centers are being developed by major technology 
manufacturers, such as NICE Systems, Ltd., and Verint Systems, Inc., with the purpose 
of allowing government buyers to gain access to virtually any electronic platform that a 
citizen in question might use to correspond with other parties who may be of interest to 
national security (Silver and Elgin 2011:1). These monitoring programs can perform a 
wide range of surveillance activities, such as intercepting text messages and e-mails in 
addition to secretly activating webcams or microphones that would normally require user 
interaction for use, all in the name of keeping the United States safe. Although one may 
believe that the federal government is alone in its use of privacy-infringing technology, 
one may be surprised to learn that such innovative equipment is slowly trickling its way 
down to lower levels of government, too.   
For instance, Ohio-based company Persistent Surveillance Systems has been 
creating aerial-based monitoring services that would provide constant surveillance to 
cities and towns so state and even local officials could track the movements and actions 
of questionable citizens for extended periods, unbeknownst to the suspect individuals, via 
cameras attached to aircraft flying around a targeted location (Timberg 2014). The 
technology has already been used in political campaign events across the nation to 
identify potential threats to candidate safety by state agencies, and Persistent Surveillance 
Systems has been making a push to get the technology into the hands of local law 
enforcement personnel across the United States. Surveillance technology such as facial-
28  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 17(2014) 
recognition software is already in use via closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras 
across street corners in multiple cities by local law enforcement agencies, and even at 
famous amusement parks such as Disneyland (thereby allowing quick access to one’s 
credit card information for spontaneous purchases), thus illustrating the fact that the 
federal government is not the sole agent of possible rights infringement (Wolf 2012). 
While cybercrime is an ever-growing concern, given that nearly $100 billion is lost each 
year to electronic crimes, thus amounting to over 500 million victims annually, it is 
understandable that new strategies in surveillance and evidence collection are needed by 
federal, state, and local policing agencies to combat this crime epidemic (Go-Gulf 2013). 
Thus, one can determine that multiple levels of U.S. government are focusing 
their collective sights on any technology that can improve policing techniques that may 
combat the threat of modern cybercrime, which leaves virtually no evidence behind, and 
certainly presents a disconnect from traditional investigation rife with physical evidence 
such as fiber strands, DNA, and the like to connect a guilty party to the criminal act. Even 
though a disconnect may appear to exist between technology and conventional crime 
committed in the physical world given the overabundance of technological practices 
being used to combat digital crime, one might be surprised to find that technology is in 
fact starting to make its way into traditional investigative practices. As a result of the 
growing demand for technology to be used in all criminal matters so as to improve 
investigative efficiency while diminishing uncertainty that may result in erroneous 
convictions, analytical tools steeped in molecular practices are poised to be the next wave 
of technology-heavy processes that the government may be readying for use to combat 
crime more effectively.   
Molecular analysis (e.g., DNA, RNA detection) has often been thought of as a 
tool that greatly improves the criminal investigation process overall, yet it has taken 
approximately twenty years and several recent advances in the technology to finally open 
the nation’s collective eyes to the fact that blatant issues with personal rights are at stake 
each time a swab of genetic material is taken from one’s cheek or extracted from a 
sample retrieved from a crime scene, for example. It is important to discuss these issues 
regarding rights infringement so as to direct molecular analysis back onto an appropriate 
path of usefulness in the criminal justice system, before such analysis goes so far down 
the wrong trail that it becomes irredeemable.   
Recently, there has been considerable movement toward a universalized, general 
population-based DNA database in the criminal justice system. To think otherwise would 
be foolish; 28 states and the federal government currently have in place laws that allow 
for the collection of DNA in arrestees—that is, those persons arrested in connection with 
a crime but yet to be proven guilty in a court of law (National Institute of Justice 2013). 
Thus, federal and state legislators believe that a person arrested under probable cause 
must surely be entangled in the criminal matter far enough that the person must submit a 
sample of their genetic profile for comparison to the evidence gathered at the crime 
scene. As such, a universal database is being created without officials specifically 
knocking from door to door and expending large amounts of state budgets (Guillen et al. 
2000). Instead, anybody arrested is simply logged into the system from a genetic 
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standpoint. Such a practice seems contradictory to the phrase “innocent until proven 
guilty,” as the submission of DNA with little more than the act of being arrested and 
charged for a crime indicates a high probability that those investigating the case believe 
the person to be guilty before the facts are presented in a court of law where the suspect-
turned-defendant can be judged by a trial of peers.   
The U.S. Supreme Court investigated the issue of arrestee databases, as issues 
regarding the safety of the public are met with growing concern over privacy rights 
infringed upon through the use of these arrestee databases. The rights regarding one’s 
privacy, physical and moral integrity, and the presumption of innocence are potential 
human and civil rights under fire through the prescription of arrestee databases, and as 
such, the final dispensation on the matter has been passed to the ultimate authority of our 
nation’s laws so as to constitute the final ruling regarding the issue (Guillen et al. 2000). 
In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the matter recently because of concerns that 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights, regarding unreasonable search and seizure of 
evidence, are being infringed as a result of arrestee databases (Rosenthal 2012). In a 5-4 
ruling, the justices of the Supreme Court ruled that arrestee databases are in fact a 
legitimate part of the police booking process, citing that the collection of genetic material 
is akin to the acquisition of fingerprints following a probable-cause arrest of an individual 
(Mears 2013b).   
The controversial ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court comes after Maryland’s state 
supreme court in the case of Alonzo Jay King, Jr. v. State of Maryland held that DNA 
acquisition prior to conviction does violate one’s Fourth Amendment rights (Maryland 
Courts 2011). In light of the Supreme Court ruling, privacy rights groups are fearful that 
although the genetic information may be for criminal purposes only at the current 
moment, it could soon be “applied for a variety of non-criminal purposes” (Mears 
2013a:1). The fear is that one’s information could be used in other criminal justice-
related subdivisions for unrelated research or analysis without the consent of the person 
submitting the information; moreover, there is the issue of lax rules regarding the 
dispensation of the evidence, thereby leading some to believe that their genetic profiles 
could be sold to other parties, such as medical or biotechnology businesses, to be used to 
help bolster profits for all parties involved in the transaction save for the individual 
uniquely tied to the DNA collected. With the DNA of 10,867,894 criminal profiles, 
547,682 forensic profiles (in which the offender is still at large), and 1,830,544 arrestee 
profiles, along with 220,126 profiles of Indiana criminals alone in the National DNA 
Index System (NDIS) as of 2014, the concern for privacy becomes readily apparent based 
on the sheer number of individuals within our federal and state databases that are 
potentially at risk of having their DNA used for more than investigative purposes (FBI 
2014). 
Some scoff at the idea that one’s genetic material would be used for ulterior 
motives in the criminal justice system or by the federal government, but they only need 
look at the policy for expungement of an arrestee’s genetic information to see the 
potential for abuse. Although all states have a means to remove a DNA profile from 
record upon dismissal or acquittal of any charges in a criminal matter, most require the 
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arrested person to initiate the process and to follow through with the eradication of the 
genetic fingerprint on file; as such, very few individuals actually follow through with the 
procedure, and as a result, DNA profiles for arrestees are often left in the system as a 
permanent fixture of a state’s arrestee database (National Institute of Justice 2013). 
Hence, an individual’s genetic profile could certainly be used for alternative purposes if 
said individual does not execute the expungement process, as that information remains in 
the database of the state otherwise. As a result, it is obvious that Fourth Amendment 
rights regarding genetic-evidence collection are clearly in need of inspection by a higher 
judicial authority.   
The use of one’s genetic information for additional purposes is in fact the 
cornerstone of the debate regarding Fourth Amendment violations. Some might argue 
that these additional uses are even more invasive upon one’s rights to privacy than is the 
initial forced acquisition of DNA from an arrestee. The overarching thematic problem 
surrounds the fact that most states refuse to eliminate innocent profiles from their 
respective arrestee databases, as already indicated in their expungement legislation. The 
issue with failing to remove the profiles from these state databases is that one’s privacy 
will continue to be abused through policing techniques that continue to utilize one’s DNA 
fingerprint in future investigations, thereby always calling that formerly arrested 
individual into question as a possible suspect, even if for a transient moment.   
For example, law enforcement officials may instigate a “DNA dragnet,” whereby 
agency personnel may begin to scan their local databases for exact or partial matches to 
the evidence collected from a new case or a cold case, for example (Simoncelli and 
Krimsky 2007:1). With this technique, anybody’s profile still in the system may be 
scanned and the individual’s privacy may come under threat again if law enforcement 
believes that a strong enough match between evidence in an unrelated case correlates to 
the information about an innocent person that, by chance, was still kept in the database. 
Fourth Amendment conservationists are also concerned by the prospects that one’s DNA 
may be used to create a phenotypic or physical appearance profile as well.   
As mentioned earlier, DNA can be used to determine hair and eye color, as well 
as skin color (ethnicity), possibly.  Once again, a search of one’s DNA left in a database 
could pick up a match to similar physical features between new evidence collected and 
one’s old, innocent profile left dormant in the system (Simoncelli and Krimsky 2007). 
The implications of comparing an individual’s DNA to determine physical makeup with 
innocent profiles left in the system could be dangerous, as implications of a racist dragnet 
come to mind, in which law enforcement target specific ethnic groups or those matching 
physical depictions based on DNA results (Silverstein 2013). With law enforcement and 
legislation already combating notions of bias and discrimination, the use of a DNA 
database to racially profile persons of interest is certainly a matter of concern not only for 
Fourth Amendment consideration, but for major civil rights violations as well.   
The Fourth Amendment problems continue to build when one considers the 
concept of partial-match analysis from state DNA databases (Simoncelli and Krimsky 
2007). A suspect may be targeted and arrested when their DNA is implicated in another 
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crime upon showing up as a partial, or genetically related, match when the samples from 
this crime are run through an arrestee database. Take for example the case of the Grim 
Sleeper, a notorious serial killer operating out of Los Angeles for approximately two 
decades (Sher and Karlinsky 2010). Frustrated with the inability to solve the rash of 
murders at the hands of this murderer, the Los Angeles Police Department decided to 
make up for inability to solve the case using traditional casework by running evidence 
from the killings through its arrestee database; what came up was a partial match to an 
individual already in the system for criminal deviance. Precisely, the match was that of a 
parent-child relationship based on a comparison of the unknown suspect’s profiles in the 
murders with that of the arrested individual already on file with the LAPD (Dolan 2010). 
As a result, an unwarranted (and possibly unconstitutional) search for the parent of the 
already enlisted arrestee was executed in an attempt to find the so-called Grim Sleeper.   
The search was narrowed as a result of parentage-based DNA analysis, which 
used an arrestee database examination to discover a partial match to the offender’s father, 
Lonnie David Franklin Jr. Upon monitoring Franklin Jr., undercover investigators found 
the suspect consuming food from a local street vendor; upon completion of his meal, 
Franklin Jr. discarded the remains of his pizza treat to a public waste receptacle, from 
which the undercover agents withdrew said remnants of the meal for DNA testing 
(Dolan, Rubin, and Landsberg 2010). Thus, the Fourth Amendment rights infringements 
in the case of the Grim Sleeper are twofold: the use of the arrestee database to narrow the 
suspect list via partial match, and the happenstance collection of DNA evidence from a 
public waste receptacle without warrant in the matter.   
The latter concern of “surreptitiously collecting and searching DNA evidence left 
behind on items” is one that also brings into question one’s true rights to unwarranted 
investigation through the Fourth Amendment (Simoncelli and Krimsky 2007:1). Legal 
critics and prosecutors able to solve older cases such as the Grim Sleeper investigation 
cite that no specific legal boundary is being violated and that an individual should expect 
that any genetic material shed in public (e.g., skin, hair, saliva) to be admissible in any 
investigation, thereby losing the expectation of privacy while moving about freely in 
society (Associated Press 2013). While the Fourth Amendment does allude to exemptions 
from its unnecessary search and seizure stipulations through situations such as exigent 
circumstances and the plain view exception, it is the precise lack of definition regarding 
DNA evidence in these scenarios that allows law enforcement and prosecutors to 
continually abuse these circumstantial cases and to take evidence from public places 
without a strong case of probable cause warranting the investigation of the person in 
question (Lushbaugh and Weston 2012). This point of contention—the idea that “the 
government’s interest in collecting a DNA sample from a person facing charges 
outweighed [sic] any intrusion of privacy”—is an issue still hotly debated in the realm of 
adjudication, as the cases of United States v. Pool and United States v. Mitchell clearly 
indicate (Henning 2010:2). Until consensus is garnered regarding the interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment and the need for DNA evidence in solving cases, both new and old 
alike, it seems that one’s privacy concerns are still subject to investigative duress.  
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The concept of being guilty before proved innocent has worsened beyond 
perceived guilt upon submission of genetic evidence by the arrestee or through the abuse 
of arrestee databases and unwarranted DNA evidence collection in public-access places; 
as genetic analysis has found greater footing in the field of forensic science, different 
methods of interpretation following the potentially unconstitutional acquisition of such 
evidence serve to skew the truth behind the analysis to create the answer needed by those 
attempting to sway jurors and judges alike in a given criminal case. In fact, some 
individuals believe that DNA evidence in particular can create “victims of chance” 
(Geddes 2010b:1). Charles Richard Smith in Sacramento, California, can attest to the 
power of statistical interpretation of DNA evidence—it earned him a 25-year 
incarceration sentence (Geddes 2010b). Specifically, Smith was arrested and convicted 
on charges of sexual assault; upon his arrest, investigators retrieved DNA evidence from 
Smith’s genitalia and had it analyzed to find that it had a mixture of DNA from both 
Smith and another individual, the latter profile allegedly being that of the victim in the 
case. During the trial, four statistical interpretations alluding to the probability that the 
second profile pulled from Smith’s body was that of the victim manifested, with the 
likelihood ranging anywhere from a 1:95,000 chance (slim) to a 1:13 chance (highly 
likely) that the victim was assaulted by Smith (Geddes 2010b). Thus, the mathematical or 
statistical interpretation alone of a singular piece of evidence—the likelihood of the 
profile on Smith’s body being that of the victim in the sexual assault case—alone can 
exonerate or condemn a person. As of today, there are no consistent guidelines for 
statistical analysis of genetic evidence, meaning that DNA evidence may be weighted in a 
highly subjective manner in such a way that benefits those seeking to gain from its 
interpretation, whether the defense or the prosecution (Geddes 2010a); thus, one’s liberty 
and ability to remain a free citizen in our society may hang in the balance of a mere 
mathematical equation and the interpretation thereof by freewheeling and downright 
subjective principles currently governing molecular evidence analysis.   
Statistical inadequacies alone are not the only problem with post-arrest analysis of 
genetic material. In fact, analysis of a DNA profile to indicate a match between a possible 
suspect and evidence analyzed from the scene of a crime is scientist- and laboratory-
dependent. Forensic science laboratories often establish their own standards for how 
strong or high a match must be between two samples under comparison; thus, the 
difference between freedom and incapacitation may be the variable threshold pattern that 
each lab sets when determining a match between genetic fingerprints derived from 
evidence (Geddes 2010a). The subjectivity of result interpretation has long been a 
concern with the use of genetic evidence.   
In a study of 137 cases in which forensic testimony was used to interpret data 
rendered from evidence analysis, a staggering 60 percent of the cases were observed to 
have issues with invalid forensic science testimony, in which the scientists charged with 
analyzing the information for jurors either made errors in statements pertaining to the true 
conclusions garnered from the evidence or made false statements unsupported by the 
evidence used in the trial (Garrett and Neufeld 2009). Again, the subjectivity of the 
individuals analyzing the evidence itself can have profound effects on the dispensation of 
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one’s freedom in our twenty-first-century society. The problem is twofold: Many 
individuals not savvy to the field of forensic science accept the information presented in a 
court of law as factual, and the lack of demand for standards and accreditation result in 
variability of evidence interpretation.   
Too often, jurors, judges, and even attorneys associated with a case believe that 
forensic evidence has been interpreted by a laboratory staffed with professionals who use 
rigorous statistical models and universal techniques that do not vary from laboratory to 
laboratory, but this is not the case, as one can determine from the aforementioned issues 
with subjective interpretation of evidence (Frontline 2012). In addition, many forensic 
laboratories are not certified or accredited by any authority that ensures that the lab’s 
work is paralleled by any universal guidelines or standards; as such, these labs are 
individualized in everything ranging from employee qualifications to interpretation of 
scientific findings (Frontline 2013). As a result, what society believes to be a rigorous 
professional means to solving criminal cases is, in fact, governed, by and large, by 
idiosyncratic and, at best, questionable professional scruples.   
With all of these problems plaguing the current forensic science system, and in 
particular the methods associated with genetic evidence analysis, one may ponder how 
such a twisted system could ever be untangled from connotations of unprofessionalism 
and rights violation to become the prudent source of investigative methodology that 
society so deserves. To that end, three major turning points could certainly help rectify 
the state of molecular analysis. The first step to righting the perceived wrongs that 
genetic analysis has imbued upon society is to empower those currently held up in the 
DNA arrestee databases through easier expungement procedures.   
Because much of the issue with DNA misuse today is a result of laboratories and 
law enforcement being privileged with an overabundance of genetic profiles akin to a 
general population database, it is important to keep the general public educated on their 
ability to reclaim their genetic information so it does not continue to cause them concern 
from a privacy or civil rights standpoint. “Even if the Supreme Court upholds arrestee 
DNA collection laws, DNA expunction laws should be reformed to ensure automatic 
expunction” (Burke 2013:4). If states are genuine in their desire to help those whose 
charges are dismissed or acquitted and they seek to maintain the DNA fingerprints of 
only those who are genuine offenders, automatic expungement upon charge elimination is 
a logical response over forcing the defendant to continue to deal with issues associated 
with the arrest after having been deemed innocent through adjudication.  
Another issue to consider involves the fact that although DNA profiles may be 
removed from a state or federal electronic database, the evidence holding the DNA could 
still be available for reanalysis. The federal legislation surrounding the FBI’s CODIS 
system states that only the profile may be expunged, while evidence still holding an 
individual’s genetic imprint may not be destroyed (Burke 2013). In an effort to improve 
perceptions of an honest criminal justice system and the use of DNA or RNA for criminal 
matters only, it is imperative that future legislation specifically outline the dispensation 
not only of electronic DNA profiles but also of the physical evidence containing one’s 
34  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 17(2014) 
genetic material, making sure to explicitly justify any decision for continued preservation 
of said physical material, or to at least establish a statute of limitations upon which such 
evidence may be eliminated. This type of legislation should be doubly important for cases 
in which the individual who submitted the genetic information is found to be innocent of 
all charges rendered in a criminal case.   
The second improvement to be instigated in the realm of forensic science to help 
reestablish genetic analysis as a tool with merit is to begin the process of complying with 
Fourth Amendment stipulations and requirements. Two doctrines under the Fourth 
Amendment currently serve as tests for lower court decisions that have ruled against 
public collection of DNA and DNA arrestee databases; these doctrines are the “totality of 
circumstances” and “special needs” doctrines (Eilier 2011:1203). Regarding the totality 
of circumstances test, law enforcement agencies and personnel therein must consider 
more than one or two facts alluding to an individual’s perceived guilt and must instead 
examine the combined circumstances or facts pertaining to an alleged criminal violation 
before determining if probable cause is in effect, allowing for evidence to be collected via 
warrant (Moore 1983). The collection of DNA from public sources and after partial 
matches between evidence from a crime with other individuals in a given DNA arrestee 
database has been historically accepted because of the novelty of these techniques; 
however, probable cause is not sufficient in cases in which one’s DNA is found at a 
crime scene. For instance, a crime may take place in a public facility (e.g., restroom or 
restaurant) where dozens of profiles may be retrieved; the presence of one’s DNA alone 
from these highly traveled places is insufficient evidence to incite the totality of 
circumstances, and great care in future legislation would certainly help to redefine the use 
of this doctrine under the Fourth Amendment so that it is no longer so egregiously 
abused.   
The second doctrine often considered when determining if DNA collection from 
arrestees or public places is constitutional is the special needs doctrine. This doctrine 
applies when government agencies can illustrate that acquisition of a warrant is 
impractical, law enforcement interests outweigh the infringement of one’s rights, and 
“the immediate objective of the search is one other than to generate evidence for law 
enforcement purposes, even if the ultimate goal is non-criminal in nature” (Lexis Nexis 
2013:1). Such searches for evidence have historically been focused upon inventory 
searches, inspections, and checkpoint inspections (Britz 2008). The idea that collecting 
DNA from a non-convicted arrestee or via public collection is a necessity outside the 
bounds of normal law enforcement procedure is a stretched abuse of this doctrine at best, 
as such generalized procedures do not represent necessities beyond normal law 
enforcement needs but rather serve to make law enforcement and investigative 
procedures easier through lax interpretation of the law.   
Certainly, law enforcement can gather such evidence and remain inside the 
bounds of the special needs doctrine if “the DNA samples may eventually help law 
enforcement identify the perpetrator of a crime, [and] at the time of collection, the 
samples in fact provide no evidence in and of themselves of criminal wrongdoing, and 
are not sought for the investigation of a specific crime,” as held by Second Circuit Court 
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of Appeals (Eilier 2011:1215); however, in cases such as that of the Grim Sleeper, in 
which DNA evidence collected publicly for specific use in criminal investigation, this 
phraseology has been abused and stretched to the limits of its acceptability. Thus, for 
genetic analysis and evidence collection to remain a trustworthy source of forensic 
investigation, it is important that legislation of both a federal and a state nature redefine 
the nature the Fourth Amendment and all applicable doctrines so as to avoid continued 
rejection by society at large. Given that the U.S. Supreme Court is beginning to hear 
cases pertaining to these matters regarding DNA use, it is possible that this may be one of 
the first improvements to manifest in the near future.   
Finally, one of the best improvements that could occur in the realm of forensic 
science to help reestablish genetic analysis as a trustworthy, premiere tool for 
investigative purposes would be for the nationwide demand for accreditation of all 
forensic laboratories. With forensics labs utilizing inconsistent methods for statistical 
analysis and result interpretations, skeptical forensic testimony in court, and states paying 
millions of dollars in restitution for wrongful conviction, such errors and inconsistencies 
speak volumes as to the need for this enhancement. The impact of forensic science on 
one’s livelihood can be substantial, and the fact that 63 percent of the wrongful-
conviction cases examined by Barry Scheck and his associates were due to forensic 
testing errors alludes to the need to rectify this crisis immediately (Giannelli 2008). Thus 
far, accreditation of laboratories tends to be a state-regulated matter.   
For instance, the State Police Crime Laboratory System in the state of New York 
comprises four laboratories and is accredited by an external body—the American Society 
of Crime Laboratory Directors-Lab Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB)—annually 
through surveillance audits (New York State Police 2013). The state of New York 
actually mandates, through legislation, that its forensic laboratories be scrutinized and 
follow the specific testing parameters and guidelines dictated by the ASCLD/LAB. 
Although accreditation would arguably result in higher costs for analyses and in greater 
state spending, the idea is to put state finances to better use through rigid management of 
forensic testing laboratories and to therefore keep the state budget out of compensatory 
reimbursements given to those wrongly convicted in cases in which sloppy, unaccounted 
forensic testing was allowed into the courtroom.    
CONCLUSION 
Forensic science is a powerful tool in the fight against crime, let there be no 
doubt; however, prior recent inquiries by researchers such as Bartos and Tam and this 
work strongly suggest that technology has progressed and quickly outpaced the 
legislation currently in place to protect citizens. With issues pertaining to Fourth 
Amendment rights, lenient interpretations of forensically evaluated evidence, the 
continued abuse of individuals’ genetic blueprints currently plaguing the criminal justice 
system, it is imperative that society collectively voice its concern for a higher standard of 
investigative practices. The criminal justice system and all applicable legislation were 
built by humanity and as such can be modified and perfected by humankind.   
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In addition, the concept of DNA analysis is a human construct. As such, DNA 
identification and any applicable technologies can be created by mankind for use in 
resolving criminal or civil disputes. That said, it is imperative that if we as a society are 
to accept such powerful techniques to be utilized for the greater societal good, then we 
must also be willing to examine these novel tools for both the strengths of their use and 
the implications of social detriment. If an impasse is revealed for a given DNA 
methodology, then it becomes society’s challenge to stand up and determine if the risk of 
use and loss of rights is less critical than the danger posed to our world by not utilizing 
this technology.  
In short, if genetic evidence collection and analysis is to survive as a golden 
standard of forensic science, it too must adapt to the changing needs of society or face 
banishment as an abusive, invasive technique that harmed greater society through 
wrongful convictions and false conclusions more than it managed to aid in the 
dispensation of true justice.   
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